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Investment Thesis
KMI is a buy because the market is currently mispricing the company due to fears over
their CO2 segment and their debt level.
First, it is currently being rumored that management is considering the sale of its CO2
business. This would be a positive because it would take away the concerns regarding CO2 and
could help lead to a higher multiple. Additionally, the company’s backlog would become much
more concentrated in higher growth areas if this segment is sold.
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Second, the debt picture is misunderstood. The company currently has an investment
grade rating from the rating agencies and currently has a target debt level of 4.5x EBITDA.
However, management is currently overachieving their own standards when it comes to
realization of EBITDA from the backlog. With several major projects coming into service during
the next 18 months. The FY2 and FY3 EBITDA numbers should be substantially better due to
management’s success and even if management misses slightly the EBITDA figure should still
improve, the question becomes by how much?
Given these two misunderstandings, the market is currently trading KMI at the -1 St.
Dev. of its earnings range when it should be trading much closer to average.
Metrics to Watch
Share Repurchases – Recently, KMI has resumed repurchasing their shares. Therefore,
because of the impact that this could have on models, this should be watched closely.

Declared Dividends – Expected $1 per share in 2019 and $1.25 per share in 2020.

Transport Volume – Specifically with the natural gas segment. As these projects
become more on-line throughout the year, the volumes should increase.
“For the full year, natural gas demand increased from approximately 81 Bcf a day to
approximately 90 Bcf a day, a 9 Bcf a day or 11% increase. This is driving nice results on our
large diameter pipes. For the fourth quarter, transport volumes increased approximately 4.5 Bcf a
day on our transmission system, 15% growth. (Company Call)”
Backlog – the company has a stated goal of growing backlog by 2-3 billion per year.
Therefore, watching the backlog as these projects get shifted off will be a key to future growth.
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Investment Thesis Part Two:
There are currently rumors surrounding KMI and the potential sale of their CO2
segment. This segment which has greater sensitivity to oil price changes (because of
volumes) than the rest of the business and, therefore, their potential selling of this
business would warrant a higher multiple from the market. The story was first rumored in
a Bloomberg article. The link can be found below.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-17/kinder-morgan-is-said-to-weigh-saleof-carbon-dioxide-business

Lending additional credence to these rumors are recent acquisition of shares by
insiders.

“Richard D. Kinder is a co-founder of KMI which was formed in 1997. Currently,
Mr. Kinder is the Executive Chairman of KMI. Under his leadership, KMI has grown
from an organization consisting of 175 employees with an enterprise value of $325
million to one of the largest energy infrastructure companies with approximately 11,000
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employees. I would consider Mr. Kinder an expert in the energy sector as he is
responsible for developing and executing KMI’s vision and strategy over the years.
We are not even halfway through March and Mr. Kinder has made 16 separate
purchases of KMI’s stock. He has paid from $17.83 to $19.93 per share and has acquired
over 2.7 million shares since the beginning of the year. It’s always refreshing to see the
Chairman make an insider purchase but Mr. Kinder is making a statement spending just
over $50 million on additional KMI shares. I don’t care what your net worth is, you're not
going to invest $50+ million on a hunch or a speculative bet. I would think that Mr.
Kinder has a great insight to the future of KMI and his recent investments shouldn’t go
unnoticed (Seeking Alpha).”
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Business Description
Kinder Morgan is a leading energy infrastructure company. The conduct business though
four major segments: Natural Gas Pipelines, Products Pipelines, Terminals, CO2.
Below are the descriptions of the four business segments according to the most recent 10-K
filing.
Segments
“Natural Gas Pipelines—the ownership and operation of (i) major interstate and
intrastate natural gas pipeline and storage systems; (ii) natural gas and crude oil gathering
systems and natural gas processing and treating facilities; (iii) NGL fractionation facilities and
transportation systems; and (iv) LNG facilities. (Company Filings)”
“Products Pipelines—the ownership and operation of refined petroleum products, NGL
and crude oil and condensate pipelines that primarily deliver, among other products, gasoline,
diesel and jet fuel, propane, ethane, crude oil and condensate to various markets, plus the
ownership and/or operation of associated product terminals and petroleum pipeline transmix
facilities. (Company Filings)”
“Terminals—the ownership and/or operation of (i) liquids and bulk terminal facilities
located throughout the U.S. and portions of Canada that transload and store refined petroleum
products, crude oil, ethanol and chemicals, and bulk products, including petroleum coke, metals
and ores; and (ii) Jones Act tankers. (Company Filings)”
“CO2—(i) the production, transportation and marketing of CO2 to oil fields that use CO2
as a flooding medium to increase recovery and production of crude oil from mature oil fields; (ii)
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ownership interests in and/or operation of oil fields and gas processing plants in West Texas; and
(iii) the ownership and operation of a crude oil pipeline system in West Texas. (Company
Filings)”
“Kinder Morgan Canada (prior to August 31, 2018)—the ownership and operation of the
Trans Mountain pipeline system that transports crude oil and refined petroleum products from
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada to marketing terminals and refineries in British Columbia, Canada
and the state of Washington. As a result of the TMPL Sale, this segment does not have results of
operations on a prospective basis. (Company Filings)”
Recent News
The most recent news for KMI is in regards to their CO2 Segment. The current rumor is
that KMI is thinking about potentially selling this segment. Many are regarding this potential as a
positive because the company has been investing heavily into the CO2 segment and the revenue
has been sporadic and dependent on the price of oil. Therefore, the market is viewing the
potential sale as stabilizing and a good way to increase capex for the more profitable “Natural
Gas Pipelines” segment which is experiencing industry tailwind for the first time in several
years. Below is the hyperlink to the Bloomberg Article which first broke the rumor.
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-17/kinder-morgan-is-said-to-weighsale-of-carbon-dioxide-business)
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Revenue Dichotomy & Growth Rate

Financial Data Source: FactSet
As can be seen, the Natural Gas Pipelines segment is the largest of the segments and CO2
is the smallest of the remaining segment (Kinder Morgan Canada was sold in 2018). Therefore,
while the rumor would not have a great impact of the top line, it would have a great impact,
potentially, on the markets view of the company, which should warrant a higher multiple.
Because CO2 makes up a large portion of their backlog, by freeing up this capital, the firm
would increase their ability to share repurchases or grow pipeline’s backlog (increase the firm’s
growth prospect). Both of which would, in the opinion of this author, be a positive for KMI
longer-term.
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Economic Analysis (Energy Sector)
The energy sector is a particularly interesting sector because it doesn’t follow the same
economic trends as the other industries. For example, with the consumer discretionary industry,
it is important to understand what part of the economic cycle a particular country is in because an
expansionary economy is going to increase consumer optimism and wealth which in turn will
increase consumer product demand and aid consumer discretionary companies. However, with
the analysis of KMI, it is clear that the pipelines industry and the energy sector as a whole is
primarily dependent on the fluctuations of demand and supply for the particular commodity that
that company helps produce or transport. In the case of KMI, the commodities are primarily
natural gas with some exposure to transporting oil. Therefore, the economic analysis of this
paper is going to focus on the production and supply of Nat. Gas as well as the underlying
secular trend that is currently making its way through the energy space, LNG (Liquefied Natural
Gas).
Nat. Gas/Oil Production

Source: Jefferies
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During the first quarter of 2019, the US has seen a nice year-over-year increase in natural
gas production, as can be seen in the graph above (right). This is a continuation of a decade long
trend of increase natural gas production, led by growth in Permian production which can be seen
in blue in the graph above (left).
Nat. Gas/Oil Demand

Source: Jefferies
This increase on natural gas has been necessitated by the growth in demand for natural
gas, which is once again experiencing year-over year growth and similar to production this is a
continuation of a decade long trend supported by growth across the demand sources, which can
be seen below.
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Source: Jefferies
Oil & Nat. Gas Prices

Source: FRED
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Source: FRED
No economic analysis of the energy sector would be adequate without a mention of
natural gas and oil prices. However, this paper is not aware of any way to accurately estimate oil
prices, if one exists it is probably being held under lock and key as because that would be
incredibly valuable. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that when prices are high the internal
rate of return (IRR) requirements that companies impose are going to be able to be met with less
difficulty and therefore they are going to produce more oil/natural gas. When the opposite is true,
they are going to be less inclined to pump commodities and production will decrease. Therefore,
it is important to realize that currently natural gas is down from the end of last year (Dec. 2018)
and the same is true of oil.
Energy Sector Outlook
Due to the long run secular trends, there are two main areas to watch in terms of domestic
energy plays. The first is the increase in LNG activity over the course of 2019 and into 2020+.
The second is the increases being seen in the exportation of US energy.
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Short-Term
In the short-term, production is expected to be flat or down slightly. However, this is due
in large part to the inadequate levels of pipelines that are currently on-line to support production.
As a result, Exploration & Production companies have had to slow production. This can be seen
in the upper blue dashed line in the chart below. However, the other takeaway from the chart
directly below is the fact that the US is now a net exporter of natural gas. This can be seen in the
lower two lines which show that the US has been exporting more natural gas than it imports
since February 2018. According to this forecaster, this is expected to continue.

Source: Bluegold Research (Seeking Alpha)
The last short term economic takeaway is a continuation of one of the points being made
above which is that exports have continued and a large portion of that is due to LNG ramping
and projects being announced. This can be seen in the chart below.
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Source: Bluegold Research (Seeking Alpha)
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Medium-Term

Source: US EIA
In the medium term, energy exports are expected to ramp and the natural gas demand in
North America is expected to double its CAGR. The expectations for exports can be seen in the
graph above and the growth in demand can be seen in the graph below. Lastly, the exports to
Mexico are expected to continue to ramp and the trend generally continue as can be seen in the
graph below. These trends should support a continuation of strong underlying demand to the
natural gas industry and require that pipelines be both built and utilized in the transportation of
liquid commodities to their processing centers.
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Source: Williams Company Presentation

Source: The Energy Consulting Group
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Long-Term

Source: US EIA
Over the long-term, The US is expected to increase its export in natural gas. This can be
seen in the two charts above with the light blue line in the right graph showing the ramping of
net exports in nat. gas with the current year being the inflection point. This would require
additions to the current energy infrastructure in this country, specifically pipelines to transport
additional liquids. Below are breakdowns in the electricity generation by fuels. The graph also

16

shows the capturing of nat. gas in terms of that electricity generation from 2020 to 2050.

Source: US EIA

Source: Goldman Sachs
Part of the increase in exports is expected to be the increases in LNG being seen in the
country over the next few years. The two graphs above show the increase in demand for LNG
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and the ramping of LNG awards that will help facilitate the LNG flow. As can be seen, the
inflection point is 2019-2020E.

Source: Goldman Sachs
The demand underlying the growth in production is driven primarily China and other
countries in Southeast Asia. This is shown in the graph to the right above. The graph to the left
shows the supply demand imbalance and the amount of LNG supply which is under construction.
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Source: Bloomberg
Many of the increases in general natural gas and LNG will require increases in energy
infrastructure and part of that process is additional spending on pipelines as production comes
on-line. In the above graph, the specific increases in pipeline capacity can be seen as well as
which project they belong to/the name of the project. This is important to monitor because the
companies spending on pipelines still need to execute their business strategy and make sure their
pipelines become operational on time and while this is a micro issue that each company needs to
solve on its own. The macro implications are still inherent as a short-term headwind currently
being faced by the US energy market is the ramifications of pipeline shortages which are forcing
E&P companies to delay spending and leave wells incomplete at times because they cannot
transport out their commodities even if they were produced. Therefore, the above graph is
extremely important to the energy sectors macro situation.
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US Economic Outlook
Unemployment

Currently, unemployment is at one of the lowest rates that has been recorded during the
last 50 years. Because of this, there is growing concern that this will begin to move in the
opposite direction after the economy overheats. This fear is further cemented by Fed’s decisions
last year to hike interest rates, even though they have said that they are seriously evaluating
whether they will hike rates in the future. Below is the Fed Funds Rate.
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As can be seen, the direction of the Fed Funds Rate has changed and the longer term
trend of fallen interest rates has been reversed. This will have lasting implications on energy
sector IRR & NPV decisions. However, the intermediate term outlook does seem to support a
relatively stable economy over the next 18-24 months. However, beyond that remains to be seen.
Industry Overview
The US Pipelines industry is extremely competitive with each firm competing for the
rights to transport energy fuels and gases from their wells to their refineries, liquefiers, and
shipping destinations. That being said, there are only a handful of large pipeline companies
because of the capital intensity required to compete. Kinder Morgan is one of these large pipeline
companies. Just as a general note, the companies in this space generally fall into one of two
categories. It is either an MLP (Master Limited Partnership) or a C-Corp. The MLPs are usually
smaller and trade at a discount because of the legal challenges that MLPs face, which includes
certain payout levels and unfavorable tax implications. Therefore, for the purposes of this
analysis, this paper will only be examining the large C-corps that are pipeline “pure plays”
because that is the category that Kinder Morgan is in.
Comps
The two best peers for Kinder Morgan (KMI) are ONEOK (OKE) and Williams
Companies (WMB). Both of these are publically traded and have large pipeline assets throughout
the country which allows them to compete with KMI. Below is some summary data about the
three companies provided by FactSet. However, only OKE was analyzed because it is the only
pure play other than KMI. The rest have other businesses included and are therefore
conglomerates.
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The above financial information provides interesting insight into the industry. For
example, in the third chart, it can be seen that ONEOK is growing very fast compared to its
larger peers (WMB & KMI). This makes sense give that OKE has been taking share from the
other for about 4 years now. It can also be seen that KMI has better margins than its two other
comps. This would seem to indicate its more mature phase and better operating efficiency due to
that maturity.
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Porter’s Five Forces
Competitive Rivalry
On the topic of competition, KMI provides the following analysis in their 10-K report.
“The market for supply of natural gas is highly competitive, and new
pipelines, storage facilities, treating facilities, and facilities for related services
are currently being built to serve the growing demand for natural gas in each of
the markets served by the pipelines in our Natural Gas Pipelines business
segment. Our operations compete with interstate and intrastate pipelines, and
their shippers, for connections to new markets and supplies and for
transportation, processing and treating services. We believe the principal
elements of competition in our various markets are location, rates, terms of
service and flexibility and reliability of service. From time to time, other projects
are proposed that would compete with us. We do not know whether or when any
such projects would be built, or the extent of their impact on our operations or
profitability (Source 10-K).”
This analysis seems consistent with what the numbers say about the industry. All three of
the comps are large players and while their growth rates are slightly different, this has more to do
with the particular geographies that these players compete in (Southeast versus West versus
North). The reason for the differentiation between the sizes of the companies, which is what
helps allow them to dominate the three geographies, has to do with the amount of oil being
extracted from the three areas and the amount of new wells that are being built and completed.
The Permian Basin in West Texas is currently one of the hottest places to be in regards to oil.
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Therefore, the growth rates and infrastructure requirements for companies in that are going to be
faster and larger than a company servicing the Appalachian region.
Supplier Power
Because of the nature of this business, the company is paid based on the amount of fuels
transported. Therefore, the supplier in that sense are E&P (Energy & Production) companies
which need their fuels transported. Therefore, KMI and the industry as a whole are going to be
exposed to the financial health of companies further upstream (upstream companies are E&P
companies). On this subject, the company (KMI) wrote the following in their 10-K.
“Financial distress experienced by our customers or other counterparties
could have an adverse impact on us in the event they are unable to pay us for the
products or services we provide or otherwise fulfill their obligations to us. We are
exposed to the risk of loss in the event of nonperformance by our customers or
other counterparties, such as hedging counterparties, joint venture partners and
suppliers. Many of our counterparties finance their activities through cash flow
from operations or debt or equity financing, and some of them may be highly
leveraged. Our counterparties are subject to their own operating, market,
financial and regulatory risks, and some are experiencing, or may experience in
the future, severe financial problems that have had or may have a significant
impact on their creditworthiness (Source 10-K).”
As can be seen, there is exposure to suppliers, however, no supplier makes up more than
10% of total revenue which help mitigate the risk to suppliers. Therefore, there is no specific
supplier that presents worry, however, given that the suppliers are heavily influenced by oil and
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natural gas prices, KMI does share exposure to factors like commodity prices because most of
the company’s further upstream will behave in similar ways during different portions of the
energy cycle.
Buyer Power
Unlike suppliers, the pipelines industry is not exposed to the buyer’s end of the supply
chain. This is because the buyers are the refineries that make the fuels useable to consumers and
there are many such facilities. Additionally, the industry standard is to have these purchase
agreements arranged before the fuels move an inch and therefore once they are in transport, there
is almost no risk of the buyer deciding that they no longer want to fuel that they have already
paid for. Thus, the pipelines industry is not exposed in any significant way on the buyer’s side of
the supply chain because of these contracts and the number of facilities which buy oil and natural
gas products.
Threats of Substitution
As with buyer’s power, this industry is not exposed to a threat of substitute at this time. It
is possible that in the future the industry will fall under threats of substitute, especially as
environment concerns move more and more to the front of investor concerns. However, the main
reason that the industry is to some degree isolated from the threat of substitution is that pipeline
transportation is still the cheapest way to get fuels from their wells to their destinations that
exists and, while that can change in the future, it currently provides some insurance against
suppliers substituting pipelines for another transportation method.
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Threat of New Entry
Like the threat of buyers’ power and substitution, the pipelines industry is protected from
new entry because of the amount of capital required to build the infrastructure good enough to
compete with the large pipeline companies. This protects the margins of the companies even in
bad times and also allows them to be positive even when commodity prices deteriorate. This is a
massive advantage compared to other industries which don’t require the same level of capital to
start up operations.
Investment Risks
Debt-level – the company has committed to a Debt/ Adjusted EBITDA multiple of 4.5x.
However, this is still high compared to the industry and leaves them with a Debt/Market Cap
of ~80% at present.
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However, the budgeted issuance of debt/borrowing against the revolver for the year is
1.638 billion against an expirationing debt figure of 2.813 billion.
Execution Risk with Several Large Projects
For the same reason that these projects are attractive, they also introduce
execution risk. The three major projects in 2019 & 2020 are the Elba Island LNG Terminal,
Gulf Coast Express, and Permian Highway Pipeline.
Expiring Contracts
Several of their sites have there average contract length nearing expiration. This
adds a level of uncertainty that could keep multiples from expanding in the near term.
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KMI Ratios
Liquidity
As can be seen by the chart below, KMI has significantly better liquidity
than its competitor OKE. This can be seen by the fact that all of KMI’s liquidity
ratios were better in 2018 than OKE’s. The current ratio, which is calculated by
dividing the current assets by the current liabilities, is better when it is higher,
assuming that it’s not too high. The 2018 current ratio of KMI can be interpreted
as 76% of the company’s current liabilities can be funded using the company’s
current assets. This is compared to only 66% of OKE’s current liabilities,
meaning that KMI has better liquidity. This is backed up by the other two
liquidity ratios (quick ratio and cash ratio). Both of these are better when they are
higher and, therefore, the advantage of KMI in both ratios, 0.68 vs 0.41 for the
quick ratio and 0.07 vs 0.01 for the cash ratio, further underlines the superior
position of KMI’s balance sheet when it comes to liquidity.
KMI
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Current Ratio
0.76
0.44
0.55
0.69
0.59
0.64
Quick Ratio
0.68
0.34
0.45
0.53
0.43
0.41
Cash Ratio
0.48
0.07
0.17
0.20
0.15
0.11

OKE
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
0.66
0.66
0.50
0.60
0.55
0.88
0.41
0.48
0.42
0.45
0.41
0.66
0.01
0.01
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.06

Turnover Ratios
The two turnover ratios used in this project are the Total Asset Turnover
(TAT) and the Inventory Turnover. Both of these are better when they are higher
because it shows that the company is using its assets more efficiently if the turns
are higher. In this category, KMI is inferior to their competitor OKE. OKE is
superior in both ratios. Their TAT ratio was 1.44 at the end of 2018 vs 0.18 and
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their Inventory Turnover Ratio was 24.48 in 2018 vs 22.90. Additionally, when
one looks at the history of these two ratios, OKE has historically been the better
company in terms of managing their assets and using them efficiently, as
measured by these two ratios.
KMI
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Total Asset Turnover
0.18
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.19
0.19
Inventory Turnover
22.90
23.27
20.93
20.19
23.57
22.81

OKE
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
1.44
1.38
1.81
2.01
1.25
1.21
24.48
33.62
37.25
38.96
39.85
28.05

Profitability Ratio
This is the area where the differences between the companies can easily be
seen. KMI has better margins however OKE is able to get better returns on their
assets and their equity due to their smaller size.
KMI
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Gross Margins
35.1%
33.4%
38.2%
37.2%
35.2%
34.9%
Net Margins
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
ROA
2.0%
0.2%
0.9%
0.3%
1.2%
1.6%
ROE
4.5%
4.4%
4.2%
4.4%
5.3%
5.6%

OKE
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
15.6%
13.0%
15.1%
14.1%
10.1%
10.1%
9.1%
3.2%
4.0%
3.3%
2.6%
1.8%
6.3%
2.3%
2.2%
1.6%
2.1%
1.5%
36.5%
12.9%
34.0%
26.9%
12.5%
8.1%

Margins
Over their respective histories, KMI has managed to consistently achieve
better margins than OKE. This can be seen in the graph below and in the most
recent year it is very easily illustrated by the gross margin and net margin of KMI
being 35.1% and 11.2%, respectively, versus 15.6% gross margin and 9.1% net
margin, respectively, for OKE.
Return on Assets and Return on Equity
However, the odd part of the profitability section is the fact that the
margins of one company are better while the returns are better for the other. This
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has everything to do with the denominators. KMI has a much larger asset base
and therefore, while they generate good margins on their sales, they struggle to
generate sales with their assets. This will be illustrated later in the DuPont
Analysis and was already somewhat seen in the turnover ratios section. By
continuation, due to the large asset base, the company also has a large book value
of equity base and because of that the denominator of the return on equity
calculation is also much larger for KMI than OKE, which is reflected in the
numbers.
Debt Ratios
The debt ratios for KMI show a company that is stable but needs to
continue to be mindful their debt picture. The chart below shows the debt ratios
for both KMI and OKE. In it, one can clearly see that OKE has the larger amount
of debt relative to their equity, 177.1% versus 130.6%, respectively. However,
OKE does a better job of converting their sales and net income into cash and
therefore has a better interest coverage ratio and cash flow-to-debt ratio. This has
been the case for the past six years for both companies.
KMI
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Debt-to-Equity Ratio
130.6% 131.3% 132.7% 139.1% 143.1% 358.2%
Interest Coverage
2.1x
1.9x
2.0x
2.0x
2.6x
2.3x
Cash Flow-To-Debt
12.0%
11.3%
11.0%
11.3%
9.5%
9.1%

OKE
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
177.1% 177.1% 177.1% 177.1% 177.1% 177.1%
4.1x
3.2x
2.8x
2.5x
3.5x
4.3x
19.0%
12.0%
11.0%
8.6%
11.4%
10.1%

DuPont Analysis
KMI
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Net Margins
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
Total Asset Turnover
0.18
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.19
0.19
Equity Multiplier
2.25
2.26
2.31
2.38
2.42
2.66
ROE
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.06

OKE
DEC '18 DEC '17 DEC '16 DEC '15 DEC '14 DEC '13
Net Margins
0.09
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.02
Total Asset Turnover
1.44
1.38
1.81
2.01
1.25
1.21
Equity Multiplier
2.77
2.96
4.71
4.10
3.82
3.65
ROE
0.37
0.13
0.34
0.27
0.13
0.08

30

Pro Forma Financials
For the pro forma financial statements, the growth rate that was used was 3.9% CAGR.
This estimate was gathered from Yahoo Finance and was the sales growth rate for 2020. I also
used this number for 2019 for conservative reasons. The sales growth estimate for 2019,
according to Yahoo Finance is 5.8%. However, in order to be conservative, this model used 3.9%
for both.
Model
This model applied the 3.9% growth rate to the 2018 sales figure and therefore derived an
estimate for 2019 and 2020 sales, respectively. Then, the operating expenses were assumed to
grow with sales, in order to keep them in line with 2018 using a constant size income statement.
The interest rate was assumed to stay the same because of constant size of the debt under the
model. The tax rate used was the same as the 2018 tax rate calculated using the formula tax
expense divided by EBIT. The minority interest was assumed to be the same percentage of
consolidated net income as 2018 (Minority Interest / Consolidated Net Income). The assets
portion of the balance sheet was assumed to grow at 3.9% and the liabilities portion was assumed
to be constant. The common equity portion was calculated by using the formula beginning
common equity plus net income minus dividends paid. For the dividends number, the historic
financials were too volatile to get a true measure of what they are likely to be in the future.
Therefore, this report used the estimates for 2019 and 2020 dividends per share that management
has provided during their last investor presentation ($1.00 per share in 2019 and $1.25 per share
in 2020). This allowed the model to calculate an estimate for shareholders equity and allowed a
calculation to be made for external financing needed. According to the model, the 2019 EFN is
$2.12 billion and the 2020 EFN is $4.72 billion.
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Income Statement

Pro Forma (2023) Pro Forma (2022) Pro Forma (2021) Pro Forma (2020) Pro Forma (2019)

Sales

$

17,286.80

$

16,637.92

$

16,013.40

$

15,412.32

$

14,833.80

Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) incl. D&A

$

11,215.78

$

10,794.78

$

10,389.59

$

9,999.60

$

9,624.26

Gross Income

6071.03

5843.14

5623.81

5412.72

5209.55

SG&A Expense

$

727.70

$

700.38

$

674.10

$

648.79

$

Other Operating Expense

$

417.73

$

402.05

$

386.96

$

372.43

$

EBIT (Operating Income)

4925.59

4740.71

4562.76

4391.49

624.44
358.46
4226.65

Nonoperating Income - Net

$

1,771.42

$

1,704.93

$

1,640.93

$

1,579.34

$

1,520.06

Interest Expense

$

1,904.00

$

1,904.00

$

1,904.00

$

1,904.00

$

1,904.00

Unusual Expense - Net

$

-

$

-

$

-

$

-

$

-

Income Taxes

$

710.75

$

684.07

$

658.39

$

633.68

$

609.89

-

$

-

$

-

$

-

$

Other After Tax Adjustments
Consolidated Net Income

$
$

Minority Interest
Net Income

4,082.27 $
$

$

662.22

3,857.57 $
$

3,420.05 $

625.77

3,641.30 $
$

3,231.80 $

590.69

3,433.15 $
$

3,050.61 $

556.92

3,232.82

$

2,876.23 $

524.42
2,708.39

Discontinued Operations

$

-

$

-

$

-

$

-

$

-

Preferred Dividends

$

128.00

$

128.00

$

128.00

$

128.00

$

128.00

Net Income available to Common

$

3,292.05 $

3,103.80 $

2,922.61 $

2,748.23 $

2,580.39
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Pro Forma (2020) Pro Forma (2019)
Balance Sheet
Assets
Cash & Short-Term Investments

3877

3731

Short-Term Receivables

1657

1595

Inventories

416

400

Other Current Assets

228

219

Total Current Assets

6177

5945

0

0

Net Property, Plant & Equipment

40911

39375

Total Investments and Advances

8076

7773

11

10

Long-Term Note Receivable
Intangible Assets

26821

25814

Deferred Tax Assets

2031

1954

Other Assets

1452

1397

Total Assets

85478

82269

ST Debt & Curr. Portion LT Debt

3,657

3,520

Accounts Payable

1,443

1,389

521

502

Other Current Liabilities

2,536

2,441

Total Current Liabilities

8,158

7,852

33,936

33,936

Provision for Risks & Charges

912

912

Deferred Tax Liabilities

315

315

Other Liabilities

1,264

1,264

Total Liabilities

52,743

52,130

0

0

Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity

Income Tax Payable

Long-Term Debt

Preferred Stock (Carrying Value)
Common Equity

35,258.97

34,651

Total Shareholders' Equity

35,258.97

34,651

36,777.97

36,170

89,521

88,300.26

Accumulated Minority Interest
Total Equity

1,519

1,519

Total Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity
EFN (2020)

(4,043.30)

EFN (2019)
(6,031.20)
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KMI Valuation
DCF Model
The model used to calculate the valuation was a DCF model. The cash flows used was
unlevered free cash flow. This was calculated using the formula: Unlevered FCF = NOPAT +
D&A – Capex – Change in Net Working Capital. Using the pro forma financial statement, this
unlevered free cash flow was calculated and then used in the DCF model. The model
recommends a fair value price of $36.30 for KMI vs a current market price of $20.23 (close
4/26/2019).
Unlevered FCF Calculation
EBITDA

$

7,706.84 $

7,417.55 $

7,139.13 $

6,871.15 $

6,613.24

D&A

$

2,781.24 $

2,676.84 $

2,576.37 $

2,479.66 $

2,386.58

NOPAT

$

4,214.85 $

4,056.64 $

3,904.37 $

3,757.81 $

3,616.76

Capital Expenditures

$

(2,882.00) $

(2,882.00) $

(2,882.00) $

(2,882.00) $

(2,882.00)

Changes in Working Capital
Unlevered FCF

201
$

9,677.09 $

201
9,414.48 $

201
9,161.73 $

201
8,918.47 $

201
8,684.34
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Valuation Model

Model
WACC:
Assumed Long-term Growth Rate:
Valuation:
Discounted Cash Flows
Terminal Value
Preliminary Enterprise Value:
Mid-Year Adjustment:
Enterprise Value:
Debt Value:
Equity Value:
Number of Common Shares Outstanding:
Estimated Share Price on 4/26/2019:
Actual Share Price on 4/26/2019
(Over) / Under Value:

6%
-3.0%
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

38,288
77,742
116,030
1.03
119,633
37,593
82,040
2,260
36.30
20.23
16.07

Assumptions


EBITDA: EBITDA was assumed to grow at 3.9% because that was the rate used for the
pro forma financials. To get the D&A expense, EBITDA was subtracted from EBIT
(Operating Income). In terms of a common-size financial statement, this means that D&A
is assumed to be a constant percentage of total assets.



Capital Expenditures: Because Capex is a negative number the fact that it is subtracted in
the formula means that one is adding back Capex. Therefore, due to a need to be
conservative, the lowest Capex from the last 5 years (one oil cycle) was used so that the
least amount is being added back.



Change in Net Working Capital: The same reasoning was used, as in Capex, for the
Change in Net Working Capital. The amount that would add back the least was used.
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WACC: The WACC used in this model is provided by the website GuruFocus which
used data to calculate the WACC and ROIC figures, along with others.



Long-term growth rate: This assumption is likely to be the most controversial. The rate
used was negative GDP (-3%). This rate was used because the common criticism for Oil
and Gas Pipeline companies is that they are trying to compete in a dying space and,
therefore, deserve a low long-term growth rate. Therefore, negative GDP was used. Due
to the fact that this model finds the stock undervalued, it is reasonable to believe that they
market is applying an even lower long-term growth rate to this companies DCF models.

Sensitivity Analysis

$

WACC

36.30
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-5.0%
49.06
41.64
35.72
30.88
26.86
23.46
20.56

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-3.5%
59.88
49.62
41.78
35.61
30.62
26.50
23.05

Long-Run Growth Rate
-2.0%
-0.5%
$
77.18 $ 109.31
$
61.58 $ 81.53
$
50.45 $ 63.85
$
42.11 $ 51.62
$
35.63 $ 42.65
$
30.45 $ 35.80
$
26.22 $ 30.40

1.0%
$ 189.65
$ 121.41
$ 87.30
$ 66.83
$ 53.19
$ 43.44
$ 36.14

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2.5%
752.00
241.07
138.88
95.08
70.74
55.25
44.53

4.0%
$ (372.70)
#DIV/0!
$ 345.21
$ 165.70
$ 105.85
$ 75.92
$ 57.95
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PE Multiple Valuation

Because of the belief, which is outlined in the investment thesis, that there is a
misunderstanding surrounding the debt of KMI and the growth potential of the company in the
coming years, due to factors such as LNG, the PE multiple valuation method will assume the PE
37

multiple will return to the 5 year average. The five year average was used because this represents
the average multiple over approximately one energy cycle. The model can be found below.
Model
2019 Net Income Availible to Shareholders
Shares Outstanding (Yahoo Finance)
EPS
Average Multiple
Share Price Estimate

2580.39
2260
$ 1.14
27.47x
$ 31.36

Price Target
Using a 50/50 weighting, this report estimates that KMI has an intrinsic value of
approximately $33.83. Therefore, this report believes that KMI is currently undervalued and
should be trading at closer to 33. This represents an upside of 73.2% = (($33.83-$19.53)/$19.53).
Therefore, this model believes KMI is a buy.
Share Price Estimate (PE Multiple)
Share Price Estimate (DCF Model)

$ 31.36
$ 36.30

Price Target

$ 33.83
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Conclusion
This paper believes that there is a fundamental under appreciate for KMI in the market.
This under appreciation is the result of a misunderstanding of the long-term growth of the
company and the significant debt on their balance sheet. However, after modeling the scenarios,
this paper concludes that there is significant upside potential and that the benefits currently
outweigh the risks laid out in this paper.
Therefore, this paper believes that KMI is a buy with a target price of approximately $33.
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Appendix

According to the recent Investor Day Prsentation, KMI is expecting to have $2.6 billion
worth of their Natural Gas backlog come on-line during 2019. This is a majority of their $3.8
backlog for this segment. Additionally, they have a major project coming on-line in 2020 (PHP).
The summaries of the projects can be found below.
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Part of the investment thesis is that management has been achieving better returns on
their projects than the market is giving them credit for. This is the slide from an investor
presentation where management first makes that statement.
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Moving from 3.0Bcfd in 2018 to 13.8 Bcfd represents a CAGR of 28.96% before slowing
to a projected 3.2% CAGR from 2024 through 2030.
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